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Abstract—Anonymity networks are becoming increasingly pop-
ular in today’s online world as more users attempt to safeguard
their online privacy. Tor is currently the most popular anonymity
network in use and provides anonymity to both users and
services (hidden services). However, the anonymity provided by
Tor is also being misused in various ways. Hosting illegal sites
for selling drugs, hosting command and control servers for
botnets, and distributing censored content are but a few such
examples. As a result, various parties, including governments and
law enforcement agencies, are interested in attacks that assist
in de-anonymising the Tor network, disrupting its operations,
and bypassing its censorship circumvention mechanisms. In this
paper, we survey known Tor attacks and identify currently
available techniques that lead to improved de-anonymisation of
users and hidden services.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, many online services have
impacted the daily lives of Internet users. With that, a natural
concern has emerged as to how to browse the Internet while
maintaining privacy. Privacy-preserving mechanisms over the
Internet are all the more important for whistle-blowers and cit-
izens of totalitarian governments, who are usually in dire need
to protect their online identity. Other use cases of anonymous
networks include sensitive communications of military and
business organisations over the public Internet [1]. This has
led to research and development of anonymous communication
systems [2]. The early anonymity systems such as Mix-Net [3],
Babel [4] and Mixminion [5] were not widely adopted as they
suffered from high latency issues, and are now superseded by
low-latency systems, as we now discuss.
The Onion Router project, which is more commonly known
as Tor [6], is the most popular low latency anonymity network
to date. However, as the anonymity provided by Tor was
available to everyone, it quickly became an accessory to
cybercrime and other criminal activities [7], forcing Law
Enforcement Agencies (LEA) and governments to find ways
to break its anonymity. On the other hand, pro-anonymity
researchers attempted to strengthen users’ expected anonymity.
In this paper, we survey Tor attacks and provide a taxonomy
for categorising such attacks. Some taxonomies proposed pre-
viously in the literature [8], [9], [10], lack a common basis1 for
1For example, if we use traffic analysis attacks and hidden service attacks
as two categories in a taxonomy, there can be an overlap as certain hidden
service attacks may use traffic analysis for their execution. On the other hand,
a taxonomy having categories such as attacks on Tor’s users, attacks on the
Tor network, or attacks on hidden services [11] has a common basis which
is the target of the attack.
their classification. To overcome this issue, we use a common
determiner for every layer of our taxonomy and clearly define
the scope of each category. Several other survey works [12],
[13], [11], [14], lack details of website fingerprinting attacks
or attacks on hidden services which are very important types
of Tor attacks.
Being an anonymity network, the most common objective of
a Tor attack is to de-anonymise its users and services. Since
Tor’s initial deployment, researchers have worked to further
strengthen its anonymity objectives. Here, we try to present
an extensive list of de-anonymisation attacks and discuss their
feasibility in the live Tor network. Our work also provides use-
ful insights into how these attacks have evolved over the years,
and new trends and directions they have taken more recently.
We present the following components in our survey. 1. A gen-
eralised categorisation of all Tor attacks. We divide Tor attacks
into four high-level categories based on the objective of the
attack. 2. A corpus of other survey work that is related to Tor
attacks. 3. A comprehensive list of de-anonymisation attacks
which are a subset of Tor attacks. We discuss these attacks
under a well-defined taxonomy based on the component/s of
the Tor network required by the adversary to execute the
attack. We summarise almost fifty de-anonymisation attacks
on Tor, found in the literature. 4. Information on several major
milestones in Tor development over the years that are relevant
to de-anonymisation attacks. We try to provide insights into
how Tor’s research has impacted its development over the
years and how some of the attacks in the literature actually
affect the live network.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
provides the necessary background information required to
understand the content of this paper while Section III compares
the scope of our survey with other related work. Section
IV introduces and explains our novel taxonomy. Details of
individual de-anonymisation attacks are presented in Section
V, mainly focusing on their method of execution. In Section
VI, we discuss the applicability of de-anonymisation attacks in
the literature on the live Tor network and Tor’s security against
such attacks. We conclude in Section VII with a discussion on
potential directions for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide some background information to
explain our taxonomy and the attacks discussed in this paper.
The Tor network [6], which is one of the most widely used
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anonymity networks today (along with other popular networks
such as I2P [15] and Freenet [16]), has been using the concept
of onion routing [17]. This is an overlay network based on
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) that builds circuits from
a user to their destination server via a circuit, which generally
consists of three voluntary relays.2 Each hop uses a separate
TCP connection. Figure 1 (standard Tor circuit) and Figure 2
(hidden services) show the components of a Tor network. The
descriptions of some of the key components and their features
are as follows.
Fig. 1. Components of the Tor Network (standard Tor circuit)
Fig. 2. Components of a Hidden Service
• Onion Proxy (OP): This is a small piece of local soft-
ware that needs to be installed on the user’s device. It
enables communication with the directory servers (DSs),
establishes connections in the Tor network, and handles
connections from the user’s applications. In this paper,
we also refer to this as the Tor client.
• Directory Servers (DS): These are a small set of trusted
and known servers in the network that actively keep
details about the complete network status. DSs produce
a consensus document with the status of the network
relays, bandwidth availability, exit policies, etc. The OPs
can download this document from a DS and select three
suitable relays to establish the communication circuit to
a destination.
• Entry Node/Guard: This is the relay in the Tor network
that the client directly connects to and hence, it knows the
identity of the client. Therefore, several early Tor attacks
either compromised existing entry nodes or installed
new nodes to participate as entry nodes in order to de-
anonymise the user. We discuss these de-anonymisation
2We use nodes, routers and relays interchangeably throughout this paper.
attacks in Section V. Another important feature of entry
nodes came with the introduction of guard nodes. As Tor
creates new circuits quite frequently, there was always a
chance that at some point it would select an adversary-
controlled relay as the entry node. To reduce the prob-
ability of this situation, Guard nodes were introduced.
Now, OPs select a small set of trusted nodes as guard
nodes and use only one of these nodes as the entry node
for all circuits until another set of nodes are selected as
guards. A node is assigned a Guard Flag by the DSs
after considering its bandwidth, uptime and time in the
Tor network. Any node is eligible to become a guard node
on the eighth day after joining the Tor network [18].
• Exit Node: This is the final hop of the Tor circuit.
Therefore, it knows the IP address of the destination
server accessed via the Tor network. Moreover, as the
last layer of encryption provided by the Tor network ends
here (unless the client’s application is also using end-to-
end encryption such as TLS), a malicious exit node can
easily observe the Tor traffic flowing through it.
• Hidden Services (HS): This is a web server that can be
hosted in a node inside the Tor network or outside of
the Tor network. These have a top-level domain name
called .onion. The OP in the server is configured to
publish a service descriptor of the HS on the DS. This
service descriptor contains the HS’s public key, expiration
time, and the selected introduction points. In addition,
the HS owner can advertise the onion address over the
public Internet. A potential client has to find out about
this service from the web or other similar means. When
the user searches this particular onion address in their
browser, the OP retrieves the service descriptor from
the DS and starts the connection establishment process.
The anonymity provided by HS attracts those engaged in
criminal and unethical conduct, including those who sell
drugs [7] and child pornography [19], forcing LEAs to
identify and shut down these services.
• Introduction Points: These are random nodes selected
by the HS at the start of the connection establishment
process. Once the HS has selected an introduction point,
it provides the HS’s public key to the introduction point.
To avoid any impact from possible Denial of Service
(DOS) attacks against a single introduction point, the HS
usually selects several of them. The HS then advertises
these selected introduction points in the Hidden Service
Directories (HSDirs)3 and signs the advertisement with
the HS’s public key. The introduction points do not know
the IP address of the HS as they are connected to the HS
via a Tor circuit, which also consists of relays.
• Rendezvous Points (RPs): This is a random Tor node
selected by the client OP before the client initialises a
connection with any of the introduction points advertised
by the DS. The client establishes a circuit to the RP and
informs the HS to meet at the RP. The HS then creates
3HSDirs are a type of DSs with some specific properties that are used to
publish the service descriptors of HSs. We use DS and HSDir interchangeably
when referring to HS circuit creation throughout the paper.
Fig. 3. Tor circuit creation and data transmission
a connection to the RP. Following this, the client and the
HS can communicate using a six hop circuit via the RP,
as shown in Figure 2. RPs do not know the identity of
the user or the HS.
• Bridges: As DSs keep a list of relays in the Tor network
to advertise to all clients, this information could easily be
used to censor and block the Tor network. To mitigate this
issue, bridges were introduced. Bridges are normal Tor re-
lays that are not listed publicly in the main Tor directory.
They replace guard nodes in the circuit, however, only
a few bridges are provided to each client. Therefore, no
authority is able to obtain a complete list of bridge nodes.
It is not necessary to have bridges as middle or exit relays
as they can be connected via relays outside the censored
area. In addition, having bridges as middle and exit relays
would require more bridges to be published for a single
client, rendering them useless. There are a few ways in
which a user can obtain these bridge addresses. They can
visit the Tor project website, email the Tor project team
or request bridges through the Tor browser.
Having explained different components of the Tor network,
we will now discuss how a typical Tor circuit is created.
Before communicating over the Tor network, the Tor client
must establish a circuit through the Tor network. The user
is required to have the Onion Proxy (OP) installed on their
device, which contacts a DS and requests a list of active
relays in the network. The OP then selects three relays from
the list and incrementally creates a circuit by exchanging
encryption keys with each node, one hop at a time [6]. The
key exchange is done via the Diffie-Hellman handshake [20],
as shown in Figure 3. Once this connection consisting of
three hops (generally) has been established, the user uses it
to communicate with the intended destination server.
Tor uses fixed-length cells of 512 bytes for communication
to make traffic analysis harder [6]. There are two types
of cells; control cells and relay cells. Figure 5 shows the
structure of these two cell types. Control cells are always
interpreted at the receiving nodes, and issue commands such
as create, created, destroy or padding. Relay cells carry end-
to-end data and consist of an additional relay header. This
relay header includes a stream ID (as multiple streams are
multiplexed over a single circuit), an end-to-end checksum
for integrity checking, a payload length and a relay command.
The relay command can be relay data, relay begin, relay end,
relay teardown, relay connected, relay extend, relay extended,
relay truncate, relay truncated, or relay sendme. The relay
header and the payload are encrypted together with the 128-
bit counter mode Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-CTR),
and uses symmetric keys negotiated via the Diffie Hellman
Key Exchange (DHKE) [20].
Although the above mechanism provides anonymity to the
user, it does not hide the identity of the website being accessed.
Fig. 4. Hidden server connection establishment
Fig. 5. Tor cells
An entity with access to traffic at the exit node of the Tor
circuit or at the link between the exit node and the website
can retrieve the website’s IP address. To address this issue,
the Tor network supports Hidden Services (HS) also known
as Onion Services. This is a TCP service which hides its
IP address from the user. The establishment of a connection
between a user and a HS is shown in Figure 4. It should also
be noted that there are multiple relays involved between the
components shown in Figure 4 (see Figure 2) although we
have only displayed the sending and receiving ends of the
relevant communications. Firstly, the HS selects introduction
points from the available nodes in the Tor network and builds
connections to those nodes. Following this, it connects to the
DS and advertises a service descriptor with the HS’s public
key and the details of the introduction points. The HS owner
can then advertise their service’s onion address using platforms
they expect to reach their targeted users (e.g. websites, blogs,
other hidden services). If someone wants to access a HS,
they need to find out its onion address on these platforms.
When the user searches an address in their browser, the OP
fetches the service descriptor of that particular HS from the
DS. This way the OP finds out about the HS’s introduction
points and its public key. The OP then selects an RP and
sends a message with the RP’s address and a one time secret
called the Rendezvous Cookie (RC) to one of the introduction
points. The introduction point forwards this message, which is
encrypted with the HS’s public key, to the HS. Once the HS
receives the message, and if it wants to establish a connection
with this client, it creates an anonymous connection to the RP.
Following this, the user can communicate with the HS in the
same way they communicate with a traditional web service
[21].
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present other survey papers and re-
lated work that cover Tor attacks. In 2009, Edman et al.
[2] published a survey on existing anonymous communica-
tion systems. Their survey mainly describes the research on
designing, developing, and deploying such communication
systems. Furthermore, the authors present a few adversary
classifications based on properties like capability, visibility,
mobility, and participation. Their survey has a section on
traffic analysis attacks categorised under website fingerprinting
[22], timing analysis [23], [24], predecessor attacks [25], and
disclosure attacks [26]. This is a comprehensive survey in
terms of research on anonymous communication designs and
approaches but not in terms of attacks.
In 2010, Salo [8] presented an initial attempt to survey and
categorise Tor attacks. Salo classified around 14 attacks into
five categories: 1. probabilistic models that provide informa-
tion about the network, based on mathematical modelling, 2.
entry and exit onion router selection attacks that attempt to
compromise the victim’s entry and exit nodes, 3. Autonomous
System (AS) and global level attacks by a passive global
adversary, 4. traffic and time analysis attacks, and 5. protocol
vulnerabilities that address weaknesses in the Tor protocol.
However, Salo’s work does not take into account attacks on
HS [27] [28] as well as website fingerprinting attacks against
Tor which began to emerge at that time [29].
A survey on de-anonymisation attacks against HS was
conducted by Nepal et al. [12] in 2015, however, it is limited to
the three attack schemes presented by Ling et al. [21], Jansen
et al. [30], and Biryukov et al. [31]. Nepal et al. explain the
basic functionality of these attacks and provide a comparison
between the attack schemes in terms of the simulation en-
vironment, the time required for de-anonymisation, the true
positive rate, and the number of compromised nodes required
to successfully launch the attack.
In 2015, Erdin et al. published a survey paper on de-
anonymisation attacks [13]. However, in their paper, the au-
thors have focused only on de-anonymisation of users. They
discuss such type of attacks on both Tor and I2P [15] networks.
In [13], the authors explain de-anonymisation attacks under
two categories: 1. Application-based attacks, and 2. Network-
based attacks. Most of the time, Application-based attacks
are a result of insecure applications or user’s carelessness.
Erdin et al. discuss the attack vectors of Application-based
attacks such as plugins, DNS lookups, java applets, active
documents, and BitTorrent. In contrast, Network-based attacks
exploit limitations or trade-offs of the anonymity network. The
authors in [13] discuss examples of this type of attack under
five approaches. 1. Intersection attacks, 2. Flow multiplication
attacks, 3. Timing attacks, 4. Fingerprinting attacks, and 5.
Congestion attacks. They explain how these attack types affect
Tor and I2P networks and present potential remedies against
these attacks.
Alsabah et al. [9] present a comprehensive survey focused
on the performance and security aspects of Tor in 2016. They
evaluated Tor research in several areas including security,
which is relevant in our context. 1. Traffic management -
Tor’s congestion control, quality of service, etc. are discussed
in this category under application layer and transport layer
approaches. 2. Router selection - The chances of a Tor node
being selected by the OP depend primarily on the node’s
bandwidth. However, there are other factors affecting this,
including the node being a guard node. The research on
Tor’s router selection problem is explored in this category.
3. Scalability - Tor’s scalability approaches are investigated
here under a peer to peer approach and a scalable centralised
approach that uses private information retrieval (PIR-TOR). 4.
Circuit construction - Improving the computational overhead
of Tor’s circuit construction is discussed in this category. 5.
Security - This section investigates Tor attacks. These are
broadly categorised into active and passive attacks. Passive
attacks are further categorised into AS level adversaries [32]
and website fingerprinting (this will be discussed in section
V), while active attacks are sub-categorised into end-to-end
confirmation attacks, path selection attacks, and side-channel
information attacks. Alsabah et al. discuss 22 attacks on the
Tor network within the above categorisation.
A survey on a very broad area of overall Tor research
(performance, architectural improvements, attacks, and experi-
mentation) was published in 2018 [10]. In their paper, Saleh et
al. [10] divide all Tor research into three main categories: de-
anonymisation, path selection and performance analysis, and
architectural improvements. The de-anonymisation category is
discussed under six subcategories: 1. HS identification, 2. Tor
traffic identification, 3. attacking the Tor network with a focus
on blocking access to it, 4. Tor traffic analysis attacks, 5.
Tor improvements, and 6. providing anonymity without Tor.
We find this categorisation somewhat vague and unable to
provide an adequate overview of the Tor attacks. The main
reasons for this claim are the lack of a clear and common
basis for the categorisation and the vagueness of the naming
convention. Although Saleh et al. describe around 30 attacks
using their categorisation, they have missed several important
attacks including recent attacks such as Raptor [33] and many
website fingerprinting attacks [34] [29] [35]. However, their
paper compares Tor with other anonymity services and surveys
the literature on all Tor research, focusing on experimentation,
simulations, and analysis. Therefore, Saleh et al.’s paper [10]
enables readers to gain a broader knowledge of Tor research
that has been conducted over the years.
Evers et al. [37]4 report on Tor attacks known before 2016.
Their report contains a corpus of references of around 84
attacks under their taxonomy. These attacks have been sorted
into seven categories: correlation attacks, congestion attacks,
timing attacks, fingerprinting attacks, DOS attacks, support-
ive attacks, and revealing HS attacks. This categorisation is
inspired by the classification of de-anonymising techniques
presented by Yang et al. [36] in 2015. Yang et al. divide
de-anonymising attacks into four categories based on the
following two dimensions: 1. passive and active attacks based
on their ability to manipulate traffic, and 2. single-end and
end-to-end attacks based on the capability of the attacker to
monitor and/or control the traffic and/or devices at one end
of the connection (either the sending or receiving end), or
both. Evers et al. try to associate this classification with their
taxonomy e.g. by classifying correlation attacks as end-to-
end passive attacks, congestion and timing attacks as end-
to-end active attacks, and fingerprinting attacks as single-end
passive attacks. Their report also contains some details on
countermeasures against these attacks.
Cambiaso et al. [11] provide a recent review of Tor attacks
under a taxonomy based on the target of the attack. In
this situation, the client, the server, and the network were
considered to be the targets. Although Cambiaso et al.’s work
was published in 2019, they only referenced the survey by
Nepal et al. [12] as existing survey literature. In Cambiaso
et al.’s paper, although attacks on the Tor clients include de-
anonymising the Tor user, the authors only reference less than
ten such attacks, while, in our paper, we present more than
thirty such attacks. In [11], attacks on the server focus on
de-anonymisation or weakening the HS, while attacks to the
network consider DOS attacks and bridge discovery attacks.
Moreover, Cambiaso et al. mention some attacks under a
general category in which multiple targets are considered.
However, this work does not discuss much details on website
fingerprinting attacks - a widely researched attack in recent
times.
In a publication released this year, 2020, Basyoni et al. [14]
present details on several Tor attacks from the perspective of
4The work is only found on Github as it appears to be an internal university
report. We could not find any published work based on this report. Also, note
that this report has not been cited in any other publication previously.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RELATED WORK
Publication Year Main Focus No of
*
Tor Attacks
Include
WF attacks
Include
HS attacks
Edman et al. [2] 2009 Survey existing anonymous communication systems 19 7 7
Salo [8] 2010 Survey Tor attacks 14 7 7
Nepal et al. [12] 2015 Survey de-anonymisation attacks on hidden services 3 7 3
Erdin et al. [13] 2015 Survey de-anonymisation attacks on users 19 3 7
Yang et al. [36] 2015 Classification of de-anonymisation techniques 6 7 7
AlSabah et al. [9] 2016 Survey the research on performance and security of Tor 22 3 3
Evers et al. [37] 2016 Survey Tor attacks 84 3 3
Saleh et al. [10] 2018 Survey all aspects of Tor research 30 3 3
Aminuddin et al. [38] 2018 Survey existing approaches for classifying Tor traffic N/A 7 7
Kohls et al. [39] 2018 An evaluation framework for confirmation attacks 22 7 7
Cambiaso et al. [11] 2019 Survey Tor attacks 16 7 3
Basyoni et al. [14] 2020 Survey traffic analysis attacks on Tor 10 7 3
Our paper 2020 Survey Tor attacks while prioritising de-anonymisation attacks 50 3 3
* This has been counted by using a table, a chart, a mind map, or a similar component in the paper itself or by counting the attack references
included in the section where the attacks are described. Therefore, the actual number of intended attacks by the authors might differ than the
value mentioned in this table.
the attack’s adopted threat model. The authors categorise their
attack corpus into three threat models; a global adversary,
capturing entry flows and compromising Tor nodes. They
compare Tor’s original threat model with the above threat
models. Additionally, the practicality of these threat models is
discussed in their paper. Basyoni et al.’s paper is the only paper
about Tor attacks that has referenced a substantial amount of
work since 2015. However, they do not reference any of the
other survey work related to Tor attacks and only describe 10
attacks in detail. Also, very little information is provided in
their paper on website fingerprinting attacks and attacks on
hidden services, when compared with our paper.
There have been several other works associated with Tor
attacks that focus on a different aspect of Tor research.
For example, Aminuddin et al. [38] investigate the existing
literature on Tor traffic classification. Their work focuses
on how machine learning techniques have been applied to
such classifications and compares those techniques. The au-
thors present a traffic classification taxonomy based on input,
method, and output. The input data is categorised into circuit,
flow, and packet features, while the method is categorised into
supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised categories. The
output is divided into five categories, namely, traffic cluster,
application type, application protocol, application software,
and fine-grained. The last category is the one that contains
the most detailed information on the classified traffic. Almost
14 previous works have been referenced in this survey. The
authors in [38] claim that no classification algorithm can be
presented as superior as the algorithm’s efficiency and capa-
bilities depend on the classification objective, implementation
strategy, and the training dataset. Aminuddin et al. suggest
that the five factors; accuracy, training time, computational
resources, number of features, and number of parameters
must be considered when deciding the right algorithm for any
situation.
Kohls et al. [39] present an analysis framework called
DigesTor for the evaluation of traffic analysis attacks. The
main attack scenario considered by DigesTor is a passive
attack, executed by correlating traffic features at the entry and
exit of the Tor circuit. The authors address the difficulties
associated with comparing different types of traffic analysis
attacks as a result of the diversity of the methods used.
DigesTor has two main features: 1. a traffic analysis framework
that considers five comparison metrics (namely attack type, ad-
versary model, evaluation setup, consideration of background
noise, and consideration of different application types) and
estimates the similarity between the network observations, and,
2. a virtual private Tor network that is used to generate traffic
for representative scenarios. The authors claim that they have
provided the first performance comparison of existing attacks
based on their de-anonymisation capabilities.
Table I summarises the main features of the prior work
discussed and highlights our contributions. Although some
previous work has included details of Tor attacks, the main
focus of these papers is not to survey the attack litera-
ture, but to study a different or broader aspect of Tor, e.g.
anonymity networks [2], performance improvements for Tor
[9], or broader Tor research [10]. On the other hand, several
works have referenced only a small number Tor attacks, even
when their main focus is to present a survey on Tor attacks
[8], [12], [11], [14]. Moreover, we have observed that most
of the surveys do not provide much information of website
fingerprinting attacks. Erdin et al.’s [13] work does not address
attacks on HS, while Nepal et al.’s [12] work only focuses on
de-anonymisation of HS. None of the papers except for Saleh
et al. [10] present information on other survey work and only
Basyoni et al. [14] have referenced a significant number of
attacks published since 2015. In this paper, we try to overcome
all of these shortcomings and provide a comprehensive survey
focused on de-anonymisation attacks.
IV. TAXONOMY OF TOR ATTACKS
In this section, we present a new taxonomy of Tor attacks
and explain its components. First, we divide all Tor attacks
into four main categories based on their primary objective;
De-anonymisation attacks, Network Disruption attacks, Cen-
sorship attacks, and Supportive attacks.
Fig. 6. Taxonomy for Tor Attacks
De-anonymisation attacks: Tor being an anonymity net-
work, this is the most common type of attack that has been
researched in the past. There are two main areas of Tor
de-anonymisation. One links a Tor user with their online
activity (associates a user’s IP address with a destination’s IP
address). An entity such as a LEA might want to investigate
an individual and find out what websites they have visited, or
else, to monitor a specific web service to identify its users.
Therefore, such an entity needs to link users with websites.
The second area is when an attacker tries to find the actual
IP address of a HS that is involved in providing illegitimate
services. We provide more information on de-anonymisation
attacks in Section V.
Network Disruption attacks : The main intention of these
attacks is to disrupt the network and make it unavailable for
users. The Sniper attack by Jansen et al. [30], the CellFlood
attack by Barbera et al. [40], the packet spinning attack by
Pappas et al. [41], and the most recent bandwidth based DOS
attacks by Jansen et al. [42] are some examples for these kinds
of attacks. In this paper, we do not cover these attacks in detail.
Censorship attacks: Tor is popularly used as a censorship
circumventing tool. It allows users in oppressive and total-
itarian governments to bypass their censorship measures and
access restricted content. Tor introduces bridges that are unad-
vertised relays to facilitate this. Therefore, such governments
are motivated to find the means to prevent access to the Tor
network. Attempts by various parties to block access to the
Tor network are therefore considered to be Censorship attacks.
China’s attempts to block Tor [43] [44] and blocking systems
such as Nymble [45] are some examples of such attempts.
Deep packet inspection to block Tor traffic [46] and Tor bridge
discovery attacks [47] can also be categorised under censorship
attacks.
Supportive attacks: There are certain attacks and research
that do not present a major threat to the network itself but
can assist and improve the execution of attacks that come
under other categories. Some de-anonymising attacks require
the attacker to control the entry node of the circuit. Therefore,
an attack that manipulates the client to select compromised
guard nodes, as discussed by Li et al. [48] can be advantageous
in circumstances. Sybil attacks [49] that control a dispropor-
tionate amount of the network can be used to execute de-
anonymisation attacks as well as network disruption attacks.
Distinguishing Tor traffic from network traffic [50] can provide
new opportunities for censoring systems to be implemented.
We do not cover Censorship attacks and Supportive attacks in
detail in this paper.
When surveying past research efforts different terminologies
are used to classify Tor attacks. We will now explain some of
these terminologies and how they fit into our taxonomy.
Traffic confirmation attacks: These are mostly de-
anonymisation attacks, in which an adversary can monitor
both ends of a network (either by compromising the entry
and exit nodes or by monitoring the links to and from the Tor
network), and can try to link the user and the destination. In
these attacks, the adversary tries to confirm the actions of a
targeted user rather than trying to uncover a random user’s
online activity. The confirmation attack conducted by Rochet
et al. [51] is one of many such examples.
Correlation attacks: These attacks also come under de-
anonymisation attacks. Almost all confirmation attacks require
a correlation mechanism to link traffic observed at different
parts of the Tor network. Different correlation techniques, such
as the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient used in Raptor
attacks [33], Mutual Information [52], and Cross-correlation
[23], can be used to identify a user’s online activity from
monitored traffic features.
Timing attacks: These can be categorised as a subcategory
of correlation attacks where timing characteristics in network
traffic are correlated to find the link between Tor users and
their online activity. The most intuitive feature used in these
attacks is the inter-packet arrival time [23]. Packet rate, used
by Gilad et al. [53], and latency are some other features used
in the timing attacks.
Watermarking attacks: These attacks are also a form of
correlation attack where the attacker can actively manipulate
the network traffic by injecting, modifying or deleting traffic.
A recognisable pattern is therefore introduced into the traffic
stream at one point, expecting it be observed at another [54].
Traffic analysis attacks: This is a very broad categorisation
of attacks. Analysing traffic features is required for most
attacks in the literature, and all attack types discussed above
can be considered as subcategories of this. Any attack that
has been previously categorised as a traffic analysis attack, is
inserted into our taxonomy based on the attacker’s capabilities
and the components required to launch that attack.
V. DE-ANONYMISATION ATTACKS
As previously mentioned, in this paper we mainly consider
the attacks that try to de-anonymise the user, the HS, or both.
De-anonymising the user is usually conducted with one of two
objectives: finding out who is visiting a certain website, or
finding out what websites are being visited by a targeted user.
Research on de-anonymisation attacks contributes to a larger
portion of work carried out under Tor research. Therefore,
we aim to provide an explicit categorisation and an extensive
analysis of such type of attacks.
In our taxonomy of de-anonymisation attacks, we consider
four subcategories based on the attacker’s capabilities to com-
promise network component/s and control them. The network
components considered are the OP (Tor client), ORs (entry,
middle, exit, introduction point, RP), HS and an external web
server. Any other resources that exist outside these components
are considered to be side channels. We further explain the
classification below.
Entry and Exit routers: These attacks require the attacker
to control both the entry and exit nodes of the circuit to carry
out the attack.
OP/OR/Server: These attacks require the attacker to control
either one Tor node, a Tor client, or a server. This category
might seem a bit broader than the others but the fact that
Tor’s threat model itself makes it very hard to carry out a de-
anonymisation attack with a single component has been taken
into consideration here.
Side channel: This considers attacks carried out using other
means, for example by monitoring and manipulating the links
between circuit components, e.g. the link between the user and
the entry node.
Hybrid: This category considers a combination of compo-
nents used in the above categories.
We have further divided all the above categories into active
and passive attacks. In passive attacks, the adversary does not
modify, insert, or delete traffic on the network, but can only
observe and collect network traffic passively to be used in the
attacks. In active attacks, the adversary manipulates network
traffic in various ways to identify traffic patterns. Figure 7
shows a summary of all the attacks we have categorised in
this paper. Now we present details on these attacks and explain
how they fit into our taxonomy.
A. Entry and Exit Onion Routers
This category of attacks requires an adversary to have
access to both entry and exit ORs of a Tor circuit. This
can be achieved by either compromising existing Tor nodes
or introducing new attacker controlled nodes into the Tor
network. When introducing new nodes, certain steps can be
taken to increase the chances of a Tor node being selected as
an entry or an exit node. Tor nodes can specify that they must
only be used as exit nodes and configure exit policies to allow
selected protocols. This improves the possibility of a particular
Tor node to be selected as an exit node. Furthermore, a node
can falsely advertise high bandwidths and high uptime to be
selected as an entry guard. Once the attacker gets access to the
entry and exit router of a circuit, the traffic features required
for the attack are usually sent to a centralised authority for
processing and correlating. In the early stages of the Tor
network, which featured a small number of active nodes, there
was a high probability of success for this approach. Figure 8
shows the general attack scenario for this category.
1) Passive Attacks: Bauer et al. [55] in 2007 described
one of the earliest attacks to de-anonymise Tor circuits. Their
attack is carried out in two phases. In the 1st phase, the
attacker assumes that they control a large number of Tor relays.
This can be achieved by either introducing new malicious
nodes into the network or by hijacking existing nodes in
the network. In the earlier versions of the Tor network, the
router could advertise an incorrect bandwidth and uptimes
to the DS. These values were not verified by either the
DS or the OP when selecting that particular router for a
circuit. Therefore, resources required for this attack could be
reduced by advertising false bandwidths for low bandwidth
connections, thus increasing the chances of the adversary-
controlled routers being selected as the entry or exit nodes of
a circuit. Moreover, the malicious routers could have fewer
restrictions on their exit policies to further increase their
chances of being selected as exit nodes. If a circuit selects only
one compromised relay, that relay can stop the traffic flow and
force the circuit to rebuild with a different set of relays. This
path disruption can be repeated until a target circuit selects
two compromised routers as its entry and exit nodes. The next
phase of the attack requires traffic correlation. In this phase,
each malicious router in the network has to log information
for each cell received, including its position in the circuit,
local timestamp, previous connection’s IP address and port,
and next-hop’s IP address and port. A centralised authority
that receives the above details from all malicious routers in
the network can execute a correlating algorithm to associate
the sender with the receiver.
In 2009, Bauer et al. [56] presented their investigations
on the impact of application-level protocols for the path
compromising phase in [55], which we discussed previously.
In this follow-up paper [56], it is assumed that the adversary
can configure their routers with an exit policy to attract a
specific application type. As an external web service can only
view the IP address of the exit router, it is usually the exit
router operator who is contacted when illegal activities are
carried out using a Tor connection. To mitigate this abusive
use of exit nodes, node operators can define exit policies,
allowing only selected services to be used, and imposing
several other restrictions. Due to the ability to restrict certain
ports using these policies, the exit bandwidth is not uniformly
distributed among different application types. This makes
some application types more vulnerable to path compromise.
The results of [56] show that an adversary with control of 6
routers out of 1444 total active routers can compromise 7.0%
of all circuits that transport HTTP traffic, while the number is
between 18.5-21.8% for circuits which are transporting SMTP
Fig. 7. Classification of de-anonymisation attacks
Fig. 8. Attack Scenario with compromised Entry and Exit nodes
and peer-to-peer file-sharing traffic.
Wright et al. [25] first introduced the Predecessor Attack, a
de-anonymisation attack that is applicable to many anonymity
networks. In the generic predecessor attack, the attacker con-
trols multiple nodes in the anonymity network, and attempts
to determine circuits consisting only of these nodes. Various
techniques, such as timing analysis, are used to achieve this
objective. If the complete circuit consists only of attacker-
controlled nodes, the attacker can then identify the user (the
sender’s IP address). However, it is important to note this
attack is based on multiple assumptions. 1. Nodes in a path
are chosen uniformly at random. 2. Repeated connections
are established between the user and destination until the
connection is de-anonymised. 3. Only one user maintains a
session with a given destination. 4. The last node can associate
a session with the target destination. When applying the
predecessor attack specifically to the Tor network, the attacker
only needs to control two nodes - the entry and exit nodes.
2) Active Attacks: In 2007, Abbot et al. [57] published
a paper describing a timing analysis attack. In their attack, a
malicious exit router modified the HTTP traffic to the client by
inserting an invisible iframe that contained a javaScript code.
The Tor user’s browser executed this javaScript code, which
sent regular distinctive signals to a malicious web server. As
the Tor client selects a new circuit at regular intervals to
increase their anonymity, if one of the malicious entry guards
is selected at a certain time, the attacker will be able to use
timing analysis to de-anonymise the user. For this attack, it
is not necessary for the attacker to control both the circuit’s
entry and exit nodes at the same time. This is because once
the victim’s browser starts sending the signal, the attacker
only needs an entry node to identify the user. The authors
show that even when JavaScript is disabled, this attack can
be carried out using the HTML meta refresh tag, although
this is more noticeable to the user. In addition, this attack
can easily be executed if the user uses the Tor Button5 to
toggle the Tor proxy, while keeping the browser tab open.
This attack is more simplified when there is less traffic in
a Tor connection. The authors suggest two features that can
5Before the introduction of the Tor Browser Bundle, Tor users had to use
Firefox to access the Tor network. TorButton is an add-on for Firefox to
switch the browsers’ Tor usage.
be exploited to achieve this: 1. using unpopular ports and 2.
maintaining the TCP stream on the circuit for more than ten
minutes. This attack fails if a malicious node is not selected
as an entry guard. In such situations, the attacker can use this
technique to identify entry guards and execute DOS attacks,
forcing the client to select a different set of entry guards. This
provides the opportunity for the malicious nodes to be selected
as entry guards, increasing the effectiveness of this attack.
Wang et al. [58] present another active attack that utilises
entry and exit nodes. For this attack, the adversary needs to
control an exit router and monitor the traffic pattern at the
entry guard. When the malicious exit node detects a web
request of interest, it inserts a forged web page (forged web
page injection attack) or alters a web page received from the
server (target web page modification attack). This malicious
web page causes the victim’s browser to send detectable traffic
patterns which can be identified by the adversarial entry guard
to confirm the identity of the user. However, this attack can be
executed with only a malicious exit node if the adversary is
able to monitor the link between OP and the Tor network. The
authors claim that the attack is highly efficient and can identify
clients using a single web request while supporting normal
web browsing. This provides an additional advantage to the
attacker to remain undetected. Furthermore, this attack can be
executed even when active content systems (e.g. Javascript)
are disabled.
A new class of active attacks, protocol level attacks, are
introduced by Fu et al. [59]. These can be executed by
manipulating a single cell in the circuit. These attacks need the
attacker to control both the entry guard and the exit router of
the circuit, and need to have the ability to modify, duplicate,
insert, or delete cells at the entry node. It logs the source
IP address and port, circuit ID, and the time the cell was
manipulated. The cell can be manipulated by duplicating and
forwarding it at a suitable time, modifying a few bits of
the cell, inserting a new cell into the flow, or deleting the
cell. As Tor uses AES-CTR for encryption, when the cells
are decrypted at the exit OR, the above changes in cells
disrupt the counters and cause cell recognition errors that can
be observed by the attacker if they are monitoring the exit
node. The attacker records the time of these errors along with
the destination IP, port, and the circuit ID. Therefore, if the
attacker controls both the entry and exit nodes of a circuit,
they can use this information to correlate and link the source
and the destination.
In 2012, Ling et al. [60] proposed a type of attack requiring
the attacker to control a few of the Tor network’s entry
guards and exit nodes. This type of attack is motivated by the
observation that even though Tor uses equal-sized cells at the
application layer, the size of the network’s IP packets generally
vary. The attacker selects an appropriate time and embeds a
signal into the incoming traffic from the server. This task is
undertaken at the exit node, which is recognised by an entry
guard. This signal is a sequence of binary bits (three cells for
binary “1” and one cell for binary “0”), however, it is possible
that due to network delays and congestion this signal may be
distorted at the middle node or the links connected to it. The
adversary entry node records information relevant to received
cells along with the client’s IP address, port, and circuit ID.
Following this, the attacker decodes the embedded signal and
if they find a match they are able to link the user with the
destination.
The Tor protocol has a packet dropping behaviour that is
common in network protocols. Rochet et al. [51] exploit this
behaviour to launch a de-anonymisation attack, referred to as
a dropmark attack against Tor clients. In most cases, when
a Tor edge node receives an unwanted cell such as a relay
drop cell or an unknown subtype of relay data cell, those
cells are dropped at the edge of the circuit without tearing
the circuit down. In a de-anonymisation attack, the attacker
requires control of both a guard node and an exit node. Also,
the circuit must have an idle time-interval. In Tor, the authors
of [51] have identified such a gap in the cell’s transmission
from the exit node to the client, between the connected cell
after a Domain Name System (DNS) query, and the response
of the client’s GET request. The attacker sends three relay drop
cells from the exit nodes during this period that are identified
by the malicious guard node.
B. Onion Proxy/Onion Router/Server
In this category, the adversary uses the OP, the server, or
an OR (single router). If the OP (the Tor client) is used to
execute the attack, its default functionality will usually be
altered to match the requirements of the attack, e.g. sending
periodic traffic patterns. If the attack requires a compromised
server, this can be accomplished by hosting a server or taking
control of a targeted server. An OR can be compromised in
the same way as was explained in the previous section. Table
II summarises the attacks that fit into the first two categories
and which use an entry or exit node. It also shows how the Tor
network has scaled with time, making it difficult to execute
attacks by controlling Tor nodes.
1) Passive Attacks: In 2006, an attack to de-anonymise
HSs was published by Murdoch [28]. The attack described in
Murdoch’s paper does not require any node in the circuit to
be controlled, and the attacker cannot observe, modify, insert,
or delete any network traffic. However, the attacker needs to
control the client in order to execute this attack. This type of
attack is based upon the fact that there is a significantly dif-
ferent clock skew (the ratio between actual and nominal clock
frequencies) in different machines, even in identical models.
The attack is executed by accessing the HS with varying
traffic which affects the clock skew of the machine hosting the
service. By requesting timestamps, these changes to the clock
skew can be captured. The attacker then probes all suspecting
machines for their timestamps. Finally, the attacker is able to
reveal a correlation between the clock skew and the traffic
pattern, thus de-anonymising the HS. In 2008, Zander et al.
[64] improved upon Murdoch’s [28] attack. [64] focuses on the
weakness of the previous attack [28], in which the quantisation
noise limited its execution. Clock skew has two main sources
of noise, namely network jitter and timestamp quantisation
error. Zander et al. show that this quantisation error can be
significantly minimised by synchronised sampling, reducing
the impact on clock frequency.
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF ATTACKS DEPENDENT ON A MALICIOUS ENTRY OR AN EXIT (IN THE FIRST TWO CATEGORIES)
Publication Year Component/s used Active/Passive Target No of nodes in Tor *
Wright et al. [25] 2004 Entry and Exit Passive Standard Tor user 32
Bauer et al. [55] 2007 Entry and Exit Passive Standard Tor user 1344
Abbot et al. [57] 2007 Entry and Exit Active Standard Tor user 1344
Bauer et al. [56] 2009 Entry and Exit Passive Standard Tor user 1880 (350 bridges)
Fu et al. [59] 2009 Entry and Exit Active Standard Tor user 1880 (350 bridges)
Wang et al. [58] 2011 Entry and Exit Active Standard Tor user 3216 (781 bridges)
Le Blond et al. [61] 2011 Exit node Active BitTorrent user over Tor 3216 (781 bridges)
Ling et al. [60] 2012 Entry and Exit Active Standard Tor user 4083 (1107 bridges)
Kwon et al. [62] 2015 HS Entry node Passive Hidden service 9590 (2647 bridges)
Rochet et al. [51] 2018 Entry and Exit Active Standard Tor user 6862 (804 bridges)
* This column shows the number of Tor nodes in the network (including bridges) by 31st of December for each corresponding
year. The values were taken from the Tor project metrics [63]. However, for the value corresponding to 2004, we have used
the number given as of mid May 2004 in the Tor deployment paper [6]. From these numbers, we intend to highlight that
due to the growth in the number of nodes in the network, these attacks require many compromised nodes to increase their
probability of success in the live Tor network.
CARONTE is a tool that can de-anonymise HS by using
location leaks in their content and configuration. This tool was
developed by Matic et al. [65]. Their approach consists of 3
steps. 1. Exploration, which takes a set of onion URLs as
input and extends each of them to include a root page, all
resources, and one random resource that is added to trigger
a “not found” error page. Following this, all onion URLs
in the extended set are visited through Tor, using HTTP and
HTTPS to collect the content and the certificate chain of the
HS. 2. Candidate selection, in which a list of candidate pairs
is generated using the collected information. A candidate pair
consists of an onion address and an internet endpoint which
can either be an IP address or a DNS domain. These are
generated by examining endpoints, unique strings, and HTTP
certificates of collected onion pages. 3. Validation, in which
CARONTE verifies whether a candidate endpoint hosts the
HS. This is done by visiting the endpoint separately to collect
their content and certificates and finally comparing them with
those of the onion address. This approach does not rely on a
weakness in the Tor network but exploits sensitive information
embedded in a HS’s content and configuration. This attack
only uses OP for its execution.
Many fingerprinting attacks in the literature (discussed in
more detail under side-channel attacks) have focused on de-
anonymising a standard Tor connection (i.e. trying to figure
out what webpages/websites are visited by a targeted user).
Kwon et al. [62] propose a circuit fingerprinting attack to
identify HSs. For this attack, the attacker needs to be able
to extract circuit-level information, such as the number of
incoming and outgoing cells, sequence of packets, lifetime,
and timing information. Although under certain conditions
a network administrator or an ISP is able to obtain this
information, the most realistic and effective way to execute the
attack described in [62] is to control an entry guard. Firstly, the
authors discuss how certain distinctive circuit features such as
incoming and outgoing cells, duration of activity, and circuit
construction sequences can be used to classify a given circuit
into five different categories: 1. HS - Introduction point, 2.
Client - RP, 3. Client - Introduction point, 4. HS - RP, and 5.
General Tor circuits. Subsequently, Kwon et al. discuss how
website fingerprinting can be used in conjunction with the
circuit classification to de-anonymise a HS. According to their
paper, to obtain training data from the HS-side, the attacker
first downloads the content from different HSs and then starts
up a HS with this downloaded data in a sub-directory. The
objective of the attacker is to link a given network trace with
a HS by using website fingerprinting techniques. Then, by
using the circuit classification technique described in [62],
the attacker can determine whether the trace belongs to the
client-side or server-side. If it belongs to the server-side the
IP address of the HS can be identified.
2) Active Attacks: Le Blond et al. [61] describe two attacks
for de-anonymising Tor users by exploiting insecure applica-
tions. One attack requires the adversary to control an exit node
and a publicly connectable BitTorrent peer. In this attack, the
BitTorrent tracker’s response is hijacked by the malicious exit
node, and the IP address and port of the malicious peer are
inserted into it. If the user connects to the peer directly, without
using Tor, the attacker can trace them easily. The authors claim
that a majority of BitTorrent users use Tor, only to connect to
the centralised tracker. By comparing the publicly available IP
addresses of the exit nodes with the IP addresses connected
to the malicious peer, it is possible to verify their claim. In
the second attack, Distributed Hash Table (DHT) tracking is
exploited, as it is carried over the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP). As Tor only supports TCP, the BitTorrent client cannot
connect to DHT using Tor, however, DHT keeps track of the
IP addresses and ports of peers downloading specific content.
This type of attack is carried out when the exit node identifies
a target user connecting to the BitTorrent tracker via Tor. The
content identifier and the port number for a specific download
are included in the BitTorrent subscription to the tracker and
the handshake messages. Following this, the attacker tries to
match a user with a similar port number from the list of
candidate IP/ports for that specific content ID in the DHT. If
they find a match then the Tor user can be de-anonymised. In
addition to the above attacks, Le Blond et al. present an attack,
known as the Bad apple attack, which can be used to identify
the IP address of other streams once a BitTorrent stream is
de-anonymised. The fact that all streams that are multiplexed
into the same circuit originate from the same user can be used
to de-anonymise the other streams in that circuit. When it
comes to different circuits, the attack exploits two BitTorrent
signaling patterns; 1. the peer identifier that can only be used
if the peer-to-peer communication is not encrypted, and 2.
the IP address and the port that are returned in the tracker
response. Therefore, two circuits can be linked if a peer in one
circuit communicates with an IP/port included in the tracker
response of another circuit. The authors were also able to use
this technique to trace HTTP streams.
C. Side Channels
Side-channel attacks use means other than compromising
the main Tor components to execute the attack. The most
common type of side-channel used against Tor is the traffic
intercepted between the Tor client and the entry node. Network
administrators or Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can monitor
this traffic.
1) Passive Attacks: In 2007, Murdoch et al. [66] addressed
the ability of adversaries controlling Internet Exchange Points
(IXPs) to do passive correlation attacks. This type of attack
assumes that, 1. traffic going in and coming out of the
Tor network for a targeted flow passes through an attacker-
controlled IXP, 2. the packet sampling is distributed over
the flow independently and identically, and 3. the attacker
can distinguish Tor traffic from normal network traffic. The
attacker then tries to match the target flow going into the
network with the traffic flow coming out of the network,
or vice versa. A Bayesian approach is used to infer the
best possible match. To evaluate the attack, simulations have
been carried out by varying the number of flows, sampling
rate, mean network latency, and the attack method. In 2013,
Johnson et al. [67] discussed the realistic nature of this type
of adversary in their paper.
A novel set of attacks, known as RAPTOR attacks, which
can be launched by ASes, were presented by Sun et al. [33]
in 2015. These attacks can either be executed individually or
combined for improved performance. 1. Asymmetric traffic
analysis - This attack considers the realistic asymmetry of the
internet paths and shows that anonymity network users can be
de-anonymised by observing only a single traffic direction at
both communication endpoints. 2. Exploiting natural churn -
This attack is based on the fact that internet paths fluctuate
over time due to changes in physical topology. 3. BGP
hijacking attack - This attack is also known as prefix hijacking
attack. In this attack, a malicious AS advertises false BGP
control messages in order to capture a part of the traffic to the
victim. This captured traffic is then used to learn the IP address
of the guard relay. 4. BGP interception attack - This is also
called prefix interception attack. In this attack the malicious
AS becomes an intermediate AS on the Internet path. Here, the
connection is kept alive, unlike in the hijacking attack, which
enables asymmetrical traffic analysis. The authors also point
out that the adversary can execute an interception attack at
both the guard relay and exit relay simultaneously. Sun et al.
execute a real-world BGP interception attack against a live Tor
relay by collaborating with AS operators. These attacks exploit
the dynamics of internet routing such as routing symmetry, and
routing churn.
More recently, researchers have focused on deep learning
techniques to execute de-anonymisation attacks on the Tor
network. Nasr et al. [68] demonstrate a traffic correlation
attack by using deep learning. In their attack, a correlation
function, tailored to the Tor network is learned and used by
the DeepCorr system to cross-correlate live Tor flows. This
system can correlate two ends of the connection - even if the
destination has not been used in the training process - as its
correlation function can link arbitrary circuit flows as well
as flows to arbitrary destinations. DeepCorr’s neural network
learns generic features of noise in Tor, allowing it to correlate
circuit flows that are different to those used during the learning
process. Furthermore, DeepCorr’s performance improves with
higher observation times and larger training datasets.
Palmieri [69] presents a flow correlation attack based on
wavelet multi-resolution analysis. This is a passive attack in
which the adversary must eavesdrop on ingress and egress
traffic. Wavelets are functions that satisfy certain mathematical
properties and are used to represent data or other functions
[70]. Wavelet analysis can be used to obtain a clearer and
more complete view of a signal, its generation and other
less evident dynamics by decomposing the signal on multiple
scales. Properties that are not evident by direct observation are
thus identified and used to correlate the captured flows.
Fig. 9. Attack Scenario for Website Fingerprinting
Concepts related to Website Fingerprinting (WF) were first
explored in the late 90’s. The term, Website fingerprinting, was
coined by Hintz in 2002 [22]. However, it was in 2009 that
Herrmann et al. [29] presented a WF attack on the Tor network
in which the adversary was able to monitor the traffic between
the privacy-enhancing system and the user. This is a passive
attack, based on the Multinomial Naive Bayes classifier. This
type of attack consists of two phases: namely, the training
phase and the testing phase. In the training phase, traffic
fingerprints are created for either a large number of generic
sites or a small number of targeted sites. These are then stored
in a database with the corresponding URLs. In the testing
phase, fingerprints are created from the traffic recorded from
users and are then compared with the database records to find
any matching fingerprints. Figure 9 shows the attack scenario
for generic WF attacks.
In 2011, Panchenko et al. [71] presented another WF attack
based on Support Vector Machines (SVM). The authors define
features based on volume and time while previous WF attacks
only considered packet sizes and their direction (incoming or
outgoing). The experiments were carried out in a closed world
scenario, and were later extended to an open-world scenario.
In a closed world scenario, the attacker is aware of all the web
pages ordinarily visited by the victim, while in the open world
this is not the case. Panchenko et al. also present preliminary
results on how camouflage affects these attacks. In their work,
a randomly chosen web page is simultaneously loaded with the
requested web page to achieve the camouflage effect.
Cai et al. [72] describe a web page fingerprinting attack
as well as a website fingerprinting attack. Both these attacks
assume that an adversary can monitor a user’s internet connec-
tion. For the web page fingerprinting attack, network traces are
converted into strings and the Damerau-Levenshtein Distance6
(DLD) is calculated. Following this, a SVM classifier with a
distance-based kernel is used for classification. This is then
extended to a website classifier by using the Hidden Markov
Models. These models help the attacker to conclude whether
a sequence of web pages are from the same website or not.
Cai et al. have evaluated their datasets against the work of
Panchenko et al. [71] and Herrmann et al. [29] and claim that
the proposed attack mechanism in [72] is far more effective.
Furthermore, Cai et al. claim that their work is the first to
evaluate the security provided by application level defences
such as HTTPOS [73] and random pipelining [74], while the
previous attacks only considered packet padding and other
network-level defences.
In subsequent years, several works have been published on
WF attacks. In 2013, Wang et al. [75] published the results
of a WF attack that used a SVM classifier and two new
distance based metrics to compare packet traces. Their paper
demonstrates that one metric - introduced as the combined
OSAD (Optimal String Alignment Distance) - reduces the error
rate while the other metric - presented as the fast Levenshtein-
like algorithm - significantly reduces the training time. Wang et
al. follow up on the work of Cai et al. [72], comparing their
work. When reviewing Cai et al.’s code and results, Wang
et al. note that the metric used by Cai et al. in their work
was actually the OSAD (which is a more restricted version of
DLD) and not the DLD. Wang et al.’s attacks are evaluated in
a closed world scenario as well as an open-world scenario.
Again in 2014 Wang et al. [76] published a WF attack with
a local passive adversary, applying the k-Nearest Neighbour
(k-NN) classifier to a large feature set with weight adjustments.
This feature set included general features such as total trans-
mission size, the numbers of incoming and outgoing packets,
as well as unique features such as packet lengths, packet
ordering, concentration of outgoing packets, and bursts. Wang
et al.’s [76] paper also discusses WF defences and claims that
all previous defences only work against specific attacks. Hence
the authors propose a provably effective defence which has the
capability to defeat any attack and requires fewer resources.
Hayes et al. introduced K-fingerprinting, a novel WF tech-
nique based upon random decision forests [34]. In their paper,
the authors evaluate this type of attack against standard web
pages as well as HSs. This type of attack assumes the presence
of a passive attacker who can observe the client’s encrypted
6Damerau-Levenshtein distance is a metric that evaluates the distance
between two strings to compute their dissimilarity to each other.
traffic. It consists of two stages. In the first stage, the attacker
captures network traffic generated from a set of web pages that
they wish to monitor and a large number of other unmonitored
web pages and uses these traces to train a random forest
for classification. Following this, the attacker captures traces
from the client’s browsing session. In k-fingerprinting, random
forests are used to extract a fixed-length fingerprint rather
than directly using the classification. Therefore, after capturing
all traces, the attacker computes the fingerprint’s Hamming
distance from the client’s traffic with the set of fingerprints
collected for classification in stage one.
In 2016, Panchenko et al. [35] published another WF attack
using a passive eavesdropper that served to monitor the traffic
between the client and the entry node. This fingerprinting ap-
proach was named CUMUL, and requires the use of an SVM
classifier. Panchenko et al.’s paper mentions three limitations
of previous datasets; 1. the previous datasets contain only
index pages, 2. they don’t allow an evaluation of fingerprinting
for complete websites, and 3. small datasets do not allow for
generalisation as the world wide web consists of billions of
web pages. Therefore, the authors in [35] use novel datasets
to overcome these issues.
Following Kwon et al.’s work [62] in 2015, in 2017,
Panchenko et al. [77] published their work on de-anonymising
HSs using fingerprinting techniques. However, for the ap-
proach taken by Panchenko et al., the attacker does not need
to control an entry guard but instead needs to have the ability
to observe the link between the client and the guard. Their
technique consists of two phases. In the first phase, they try
to detect whether there is communication with the HSs. They
further break down this phase into detecting unknown HS com-
munications and detecting known HS communications. For
both of these scenarios, the authors apply a binary classifier.
In the second phase, they try to detect the HS visited by the
client. Assuming that HS communication has already been
detected in phase 1, phase 2 is explored by the authors in
the following two ways: 1. the adversary wants to detect a
targeted set of HSs, and 2. the adversary knows all the HSs
and wants to find out which one is being visited by the client.
However, the authors claim that in general, neither this attack
nor other existing attacks scale in realistic settings. The claim
that WF attacks are not properly scaled to be effective in the
live network had previously been discussed by Juarez et al.
[78] in 2014.
One of the main disadvantages of any traffic-analysis based
attack is the huge storage and computational overheads re-
quired due to massive traffic volumes. Nasr et al. [79] address
this issue by introducing compressive traffic analysis, a tech-
nique in which traffic analysis is conducted on compressed
features and not raw features. This approach is inspired by
compressed sensing [80], which is an active area in signal
processing. Nasr et al. present two main reasons for the
feasibility of compressive traffic analysis. 1. Traffic features
such as packet timings and sizes are sparse signals, in which
the compressed sensing algorithms work best. 2. The restricted
isometry property of compressed sensing algorithms [80] al-
lows traffic features to keep their Euclidean distances after
compression, which allows traffic analysis to be conducted
on compressed features. Based on this concept, compressive
flow correlation and compressive website fingerprinting are
introduced and compared with state of the art techniques. The
authors used k-NN and SVM classifiers for the website finger-
printing attack, thus demonstrating that compressive website
fingerprinting requires lower storage and computational time
compared to its traditional counterparts.
An inherent issue of WF attacks in the literature is that
they often neglect realistic scenarios. For example, researchers
often assume that there are only discrete visits to webpages,
thus ignoring hyperlink transmissions. Zhou et al. [81] propose
a WF attack based on the Profile Hidden Markov Model
(PHMM), a technique that is used for DNA sequencing analy-
sis in bioinformatics. Their main argument is that even though
there may be noise impacting the results in scenarios such as
subsequent visits by a user to a webpage using hyperlinks, key
elements can still be used to identify a website. The authors
equate this to the fact that while there are different genes in an
organism under different environmental factors, its essential
functionality genes do not change. Based on this argument,
Zhou et al. claim that their WF attack is more applicable in
practice. Furthermore, their paper provides a useful taxonomy
and a comparison of WF attacks up to 2016.
Different WF attacks use different classifiers or feature
sets. Most of the time, these features are manually extracted
and are specific to a certain attack. A paper published by
Rimmer et al. [83] in 2018 claims to present the first WF
approach that carries out automatic feature extraction. The
authors argue that since the classifier and the features are fixed
for most of the attacks, it is easy to develop defences against
them. However, this is not the case against their attack. Deep
learning models such as the feedforward Stacked Denoising
Autoencoder (SDAE), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN),
and recurrent Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) were applied
to their approach.
Sirinam et al. [84] describe a more recent WF attack against
the Tor network, titled Deep Fingerprinting, which uses CNNs.
They claim that this attack has an accuracy of 98% without
defences, more than 90% against WTF-PADs [86], and 49.7%
against Walkie-Talkies [87]; two main defences against WF
attacks that were seriously being considered for deployment
by the Tor project [88]. As a result, the authors have expressed
their concerns and disclosed their findings to the Tor project.
This attack was conducted in both closed and open-world
settings.
Greschbach et al. [82] present a new set of correlation
attacks called DefecTor attacks that use DNS traffic for
precision improvement. As DNS uses the User Datagram
Protocol (UDP), which is not supported by Tor, Tor provides
a workaround. The OP transfers the hostname and port to
the exit node, and the exit node resolves the address. If the
DNS resolution is successful, the exit node opens a new TCP
connection to the target server. In Greschbach et al.’s paper,
a conventional WF attack is combined with the egress DNS
traffic observed by a passive attacker. The attack can be carried
out by observing the links or running a compromised entry
node and a DNS resolver or server. Two DefecTor classifiers
are proposed by extending Wang et al.’s k-NN classifier [76].
In a very recent publication, Pulls et al. [85] introduce the
security notion of a Website Oracle, which can be combined
with a WF attack to increase its effectiveness. A WO provides
information on whether a particular monitored website was
visited via Tor at a given time. In general, WO further
improves the WF classification’s performance. DNS resolvers
used by Greschbach et al. [82] are an example of a WO source.
However, Pulls et al. also mention other WO sources. Web
server access logs, content delivery networks, exit relays, Tor
DSs, Real-Time Bidding (RTB) [89], and dragnet surveillance
programs, are some such examples. For their experiments, the
authors used Sirinam et al.’s Deep Fingerprinting attack [84]
in conjunction with WOs. Table III provides a summary of all
the WF attacks we have discussed in this paper.
Yang et al. [90] worked on a completely different de-
anonymisation scenario to previous attacks we have described
in this section. In their attack, they tried to identify the
websites visited by a smartphone user via Tor. A malicious
USB charging device, such as the ones in public USB charging
stations, was the assumed attacker. The authors used the
official Tor apps on Android - Orbot and Orfox. 1. Orbot
implements a local proxy to provide Tor access to mobile
phones, and 2. Orfox is a Firefox based browser for smart-
phones. For their attack, the authors considered some realistic
factors such as the network type (LTE or Wifi) and the battery
level. Following this, the authors extracted time and frequency
features from these traces and used them in a random forest
classifier. However, as they only used 100 websites (50 regular
and 50 onion services) in their experiments, they have claimed
their work as a proof of concept.
2) Active Attacks: Most side-channel attacks available in
the surveyed literature are passive. However, Gilad et al. [53]
describe an active attack where the attacker influences the rate
of communication between the exit node and the server and
is therefore able to observe the traffic between the client and
the entry guard. Firstly, the attacker sends spoofed packets
(with the server’s address and port as a source) from the probe
circuit to the exit node. Then the exit node sends a duplicate
acknowledgement (ACK) to the server. Three such duplicate
ACKs are interpreted by TCP as a congestion event, and the
servers’ congestion window shrinks, resulting in a reduction
of the transmission rate. This is observed by the attacker
at the client end, thus de-anonymising the communications.
However, it should be noted that Gilad et al.’s paper [53] was
published with only preliminary results for this type of de-
anonymisation attack.
Arp et al. [91] introduce another side-channel de-
anonymisation attack on Tor called Torben. This attack ex-
ploits an interplay of the following scenarios. 1. The ability
to manipulate a web page to load content from an untrusted
origin, and 2. the visibility of the size of requests-response
pairs of web traffic, regardless of them being encrypted. The
basic idea of this attack is to implant a web page marker into
the response from the server which induces a recognisable
traffic pattern that can be observed by a passive attacker at
the user’s end. Arp et al. discuss two variants of the attack,
depending on the type of marker. A remote marker can be
used for web pages that allow content from other origins such
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS AGAINST TOR
Publication Year Classifier Setting Unique/Novel claims
Herrmann et al. [29] 2009 Multinomial Nave-Bayes Closed Apply WF to anonymous networks
Panchenko et al. [71] 2011 Support Vector Machine Both First successful attack for open-world scenario
Cai et al. [72] 2012 Support Vector Machine Closed Propose both web page and website fingerprinting attacksHidden Markov Model Open First evaluation of application level defences
Wang et al. [75] 2013 Support Vector Machine Both Propose 2 new distance based metrics to compare packet traces
Wang et al. [76] 2014 k-Nearest Neighbour Open Design a provably effective defence against WF attacks
Kwon et al. [62] 2015 k-Nearest Neighbour Both Apply WF for hidden services
Hayes et al. [34] 2016 Random decision forests Both Possible to launch WF attacks even with lots of noise
Panchenko et al. [35] 2016 Support Vector Machine Both Web page fingerprinting in not practical at internet scale
Panchenko et al. [77] 2017 Binary classifier & SVM Both Performance and limits of fingerprinting attacks on HSs
Greschbach et al. [82] 2017 Modified k-NN Both Associate DNS traffic for WF attacks
Nasr et al. [79] 2017 k-NN & SVM Open Introduce compressive website fingerprinting
Zhou et al. [81] 2018 Profile Hidden Markov Model Both Consider hyperlink transitions made by users
Rimmer et al. [83] 2018 SDAE, CNN & LSTM Both Apply DL algorithms for WF and automatic feature extraction
Sirinam et al. [84] 2018 Convolutional Neural Network Both Undermine WF defences considered for deployment in Tor
Pulls et al. [85] 2020 Convolutional Neural Network Open Introduce the notion of a Website Oracle
SDAE - Stacked Denoising Autoencoder, CNN - Convolutional Neural Network, LSTM - Long Short-Term Memory, DL - Deep Learning
as advertisements, and a local marker is an item on a web
page into which the attacker directly injects content. Arp et
al.’s attack assumes a real-world adversary who has access to
the traffic between the Tor client and the entry node.
D. Hybrid
If a mix of Tor network components from the previous cat-
egories is used for an attack, it is categorised under the Hybrid
category. For example, if an attack requires any combination
of a Tor node, a server, a client, and a side-channel, they are
considered here.
Fig. 10. Client Scenario in Øverlier et al.’s HS attack
1) Passive Attacks: In 2006, Øverlier et al. [27] presented
the first known attack on Tor’s HSs. In their attack scenario,
an attacker-controlled client directly connected to the RP in
order to reduce the latency between the client and the HS.
In addition, Øverlier et al. controlled a middleman Tor node
which advertised false up-time and bandwidth, expecting to be
selected as a part of the circuit between the HS and the RP.
Figure 10 shows this attack scenario. Following this, a traffic
pattern was generated from the client and was expected to be
observed by the malicious node to determine whether the node
was selected as a part of the circuit with the HS. This type
of match confirmation is based on basic packet counting with
regard to timing information and the direction of traffic. The
next issue faced by the authors was to identify the position of
the node in the circuit. As the client was aware of the RP’s IP
address, it was able to determine when the malicious node was
closest to the RP. When this happens, the circuit is torn down
and a new connection is forced in the next attempt. If both IP
addresses connected to the attacker node are unknown, follow-
up attacks are suggested to determine its position. 1. Service
Location Attack - HS can be hosted either on a node in the
Tor network (server scenario) or an external client using the
Tor network (client scenario). This approach is based on DSs
having a public list of all server nodes in the network. If an IP
address connected to the attacker node is not available in the
public list of nodes then it must be the IP address of a HS,
hosted in an external client (client scenario). 2. Predecessor
attack - The basic concepts of this type of attack [25] were
initially discussed under Entry and Exit router passive attacks.
By collecting the IP address statistics, the IP address of the
HS can be deduced via traffic pattern matches that have been
found while communicating with the HS. 3. The distance
attack - This approach calculates the round trip time of a
node’s traffic to determine whether it’s closer to the HS or
not. Moreover, the authors point out that if the attacker owns
the RP in addition to the other malicious Tor node, the speed
and accuracy of the attack can be increased. This is because
if the attacker-controlled Tor node is selected as the middle
node of the circuit, it can be easily identified as the RP knows
the IP address of the node next to it.
Bauer et al. [92] investigate the benefits and drawbacks
of two-hop and three-hop paths in Tor, based on security
and performance perspectives. Their paper describes an attack
based on Adaptive Surveillance in which the objective is to
find the identity of the entry guard, assuming that the LEAs
or other powerful adversaries can adaptively demand network
logs from the entry guard’s network. They experiment with
three-hop scenarios where the attacker controls exit and middle
routers to identify the entry guard.
Mittal et al. [93] present two types of attacks, one to identify
the Tor circuit’s guard relays and another one to link two
streams multiplexed over the same circuit using Throughput
fingerprinting. For the first attack, the attacker should have the
ability to observe the throughput of the target flow. This can be
achieved by using a compromised exit relay, a web server or
an ISP. In this type of attack, one-hop circuits are developed
through suspected Tor relays and probed. The attacker does
not need to alter the traffic. In addition, the probing can be
conducted from a suitable vantage point. If the throughput of
the target flow and the probe flow correlate highly it can be
assumed that the experimenting node is a part of the target
flow. Mittal et al. demonstrate that by doing this for several
of a client’s circuits and observing the frequency of Tor nodes
that are discovered as part of the flow, it can be assumed that
these nodes are the circuit’s guard nodes as guard nodes have
a very high probability of being in a client’s circuits. This
concept is further used to identify HSs hosted on Tor relays
as that relay will have the highest frequency of being part of
the circuit.
2) Active Attacks: One of the earliest de-anonymisation
attacks against the Tor network was published by Murdoch
et al. [24] in 2005. This traffic analysis attack takes into
account the fact that a Tor node’s load affects the latency of
all connections through that node. The attack uses a corrupt
server to send unique traffic patterns, consisting of sequences
of short data bursts. The attacker also controls a Tor node,
which creates a connection through a targeted node. Following
this, the attacker sends probe traffic through the established
connection to identify the latency and to detect traffic signals
passing through the node. This way, the attacker can identify
a target circuit’s nodes. However, the attacker must access
the victim’s entry guard to identify the actual originator of
the connection. The authors mention that a simple strategy
to use cover traffic does not prevent this type of attack, as
the attack depends on indirect measurements of stream traffic.
Additionally, the authors propose a linkability attack, which
tries to determine whether two streams coming out of a node
belong to the same initiator or not. Furthermore, the authors
suggest a few variants of their attack as follows. 1. If the
corrupt server cannot significantly modulate the traffic, the
modulated probe traffic can be sent to the victim’s Tor node
in a loop and can detect the effect upon requests sent by the
targeted sender. 2. If the attacker cannot modify the traffic but
can observe the link, a known traffic pattern on the server can
be used for this attack. 3. If the attacker cannot modulate or
observe link traffic then they may resort to observing response
times on the server. 4. A DOS attack can be executed on the
destination server and can observe the decreased load upon
the Tor nodes.
Hopper et al. [94] present two attacks based on network
latency: a de-anonymisation attack and a linkability attack.
The de-anonymisation attack is carried out using a malicious
client, server, and a Tor node. The first step of the attack
is similar to the attack presented by Murdoch et al. [24]
wherein the malicious Tor node and the server collude to reveal
the nodes in the target circuit. Following this, the attacker
estimates Round Trip Times (RTT) for several candidate
victims. Afterwards, the malicious client connects to the server
using the same set of nodes and checks its RTT to compare
it with those of candidate victims. The authors also propose a
linkability attack using two colluding servers and calculating
the RTT.
Fig. 11. Attack Scenario of Evans et al.
In 2009, Evans et al. [95] published a paper arguing that
the attack presented by Murdoch et al. in 2005 [24] was not
practical due to the growth of the Tor network. Evans et al.
present a new solution by combining the original attack with
a novel bandwidth amplification attack. In this scenario, the
adversary has to control an exit node, a client and a server to
execute their attack. Firstly, the attacker injects a JavaScript
code into an HTML response. This JavaScript code sends
periodical HTTP requests, including the time stamp, to which
the exit node returns an empty response. Then the malicious
client and malicious server create a long path (where the circuit
is being looped) for each candidate node (and two helper
nodes with high bandwidth). They then start transmitting data
to initiate a congestion attack on the candidate node. If the
candidate node is part of the target circuit, the exit router
observes a significant delay pattern matching the power of the
attack. Figure 11 shows the attack scenario for this attack. It
should also be noted that in 2013, Chan-Tin et al. [96] revisited
the Murdoch et al. attack [24] and demonstrated that it was
still possible to execute regardless of Evans et al.’s claims. The
attack by Chan-Tin et al. is very similar to that of Murdoch
et al., with a few modifications.
Chakravarty et al. [97] present an attack by estimating
the bandwidth of Tor nodes by using available bandwidth
estimation tools. They used LinkWidth, a tool that can estimate
the available and capacity bandwidth on a path [98]. This
type of attack requires a malicious server to inject bandwidth
fluctuations to the circuit. Following this, all Tor nodes are
probed repeatedly to detect these bandwidth fluctuations using
LinkWidth. However, this process only allows the attacker to
identify the Tor nodes in the target circuit. In order to find
out the identity of the Tor client, the attacker has to monitor
the fluctuations on the link between the client and the entry
node, an action that would only be practical to an AS-level
adversary or an ISP. This process can also be used to identify
HSs with the use of a malicious client instead of a server to
induce the bandwidth fluctuations.
Ling et al. [21] discuss a type of attack that can be used to
de-anonymise HSs. For this, the attacker has to have control
over a Tor client, an RP, some entry routers, and a central
server. The attack is carried out in three steps. 1. Identifying
the HS, presumably by trying to connect it to one of the
compromised entry nodes. A special combination of cells of
different types is used for this. 2. Confirming the HS by
sending a modified cell from the RP, which destroys the circuit.
3. Recording the details about timing and IP addresses from
the RP and entry routers in the attacker-controlled central
server, which is finally correlated to conclude the IP address
of the HS. The authors claim that their true positive rate
is 100% but mention two complications of this attack. 1.
The typical expiry date of entry guards is 30-60 days, and
if no compromised routers are selected as HS entry guards,
this approach fails. 2. If the operator selects their trusted
routers or bridges as entry guards, the attacker has to resort
to an additional step to find out what these routers are and
compromise them before executing the original attack.
Gedds et al. [102] introduce a set of attacks, known as
Induced Throttling Attacks. These attacks assume a scenario
in which the attacker controls an exit node and some middle
nodes to identify candidate entry guards. One attack exploits
a feature of Tor’s congestion control algorithm. These algo-
rithms send “backward control cells” to request data from edge
nodes. When the nodes do not receive these cells, they stop
sending data until the next cell is received. A malicious exit
node can use this mechanism to artificially create congestion
and create specific patterns in a circuit. This affects all circuits
going through the relevant node. The attacker then uses ma-
licious middle nodes to create one-hop probe circuits through
suspicious entry guards, in order to identify these patterns by
measuring the throughput and congestion on these circuits at
regular intervals. The second attack also utilises the fact that
the throttle rate of a circuit depends on the number of client-to-
guard connections. To execute this attack the adversary only
needs a malicious client and an exit node. They can create
multiple connections to a guard node and toggle its throttling
rate while the exit node tries to identify the pattern. However,
as this attack can only be used to identify the entry guard,
additional steps are required to de-anonymise the sender.
Sulaiman et al. [103] describe an attack using unpopular
ports in Tor. For reasons like bandwidth greediness, associ-
ated spamming and de-anonymisation risks, many volunteers
restrict certain ports from use in their Tor nodes. Some of
these ports include SMTP (25), NNTP (119), NNTPS (563),
and many P2P ports. The attack explained in [103] happens
in several steps. Firstly, the attacker compromises a web
server, then they inject malicious entry and exit routers to the
network, each advertising a high bandwidth. These exit routers
allow targeted unpopular ports. When a client connects to the
compromised web server through a popular port, it sends back
a hidden script with the requested web page. When the client
executes the hidden script, the script forces the client to create
a connection through Tor using the targeted unpopular port.
If a circuit is established via two malicious nodes then the
attacker is able to use traffic analysis to de-anonymise the
user.
Chakravarty et al. [99] present an attack using NetFlow
records. The authors mention two attack scenarios; one that de-
anonymises the client and one that de-anonymises a HS. For
the first attack, the adversary must have a malicious server and
entry nodes under their control. The attacker then injects traffic
patterns that are identified by the entry guards. In the second
attack, a malicious Tor client injects a traffic pattern that can be
identified by an adversary-controlled HS entry node. The flow
records in these scenarios are used to calculate a correlation
coefficient to link the two endpoints.
Biryukov et al. [31] suggest an attack to de-anonymise
HSs. In this type of attack, the attacker requires a mali-
cious client, an RP, and some guard nodes. When a client
tries to connect to the HS, they send a Rendezvous Cookie
(RC) and the RP’s address to an introduction point of the
HS (refer Figure 4). Following this, the introduction point
communicates these details to the HS. The HS sends a
RELAY COMMAND RENDEZVOUS1 cell containing the
RC to the RP to build the circuit between RP and the HS.
Upon receiving this, the malicious RP sends 50 padding
cells back to the HSs (which are discarded by the HS)
followed by a DESTROY cell. If there is an attacker-controlled
guard node in this circuit, it is identified as follows. 1.
Whenever the attacker node receives a DESTROY cell it
checks whether the DESTROY cell was received just after
the RELAY COMMAND RENDEZVOUS1 cell. 2. Follow-
ing this, it checks whether the number of cells forwarded
from the HS is 3 (2 RELAY COMMAND EXTEND cells
+ 1 RENDEZVOUS1 cell) and transmitted to the HS is 53
(50 Padding Cells + 2 RELAY COMMAND EXTENDED
cells + 1 DESTROY cell). If both of these conditions are
met then the attacker node is selected as a guard node. As
the guard node knows the IP address of the HS, it can be
de-anonymised. The same concept can be used to identify
when the attacker node is selected as the middle node of the
HS-RP circuit when the numbers of forwarded cells are 2
and 52 (without 1 RELAY COMMAND EXTEND cell and
RELAY COMMAND EXTENDED cell respectively). In this
scenario, the attacker can identify the guard nodes and try to
compromise or block them.
Jansen et al. [30] propose a DOS attack known as the Sniper
Attack that can disable arbitrary Tor relays by exploiting Tor’s
flow control mechanisms. They discuss few variants of the
attack targeting entry and exit relays of a circuit. The attack
scenarios are as follows. 1. In the first attack, the attacker
controls the client and an exit relay, intending to disable the
entry guard. Here, the exit relay generates packages - ignoring
the package window limits - and sends these through the
circuit. The client does not read any packages coming from
the entry node. The entry node buffer overflows and the Tor
process is terminated. 2. In the second attack, the adversary
controls the client and file server and targets the exit node.
Similarly to the previous attack, the client generates packages
while the server stops reading from the TCP connection, and
the Tor process in the exit relay is killed by the relay’s OS
when memory resources are depleted. 3. In the third attack, the
adversary only needs to control the client and download a large
file from an external server. The client then stops reading from
its TCP connection while sending SENDME cells to the exit
node. Similar to attack one, the Tor process of the entry node
is killed when the buffer overflows. However, we are interested
in this attack because it can be used to de-anonymise HSs. In
order to do that, the attacker needs to control a guard node
and an RP in addition to the client. Firstly, the attacker must
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF HIDDEN SERVICE ATTACKS
Publication Year Components used Active/Passive Comments
Øverlier et al. [27] 2006 HS Entry and OP Passive First attack on HSs
Murodch [28] 2006 Onion proxy Passive Use changes in clock skew
Zander et al. [64] 2008 Onion proxy Passive Reduce quantisation error in Murdoch 2006 attack
Chakravarty et al. [97] 2010 OP and LinkWidth Active Use available bandwidth estimation tools
Mittal et al. [93] 2011 Onion proxy Passive Can only be used for HSs hosted in Tor nodes
Ling et al. [21] 2013 HS Entry, OP and RP Active Protocol-level discovery approach
Biryukov et al. [31] 2013 HS Entry, OP and RP Active Use a special padding cell technique in Tor
Chakravarty et al. [99] 2014 HS Entry and OP Active Use NetFlow traffic records
Jansen et al. [30] 2014 HS Entry, OP and RP Active Complementary DOS attack for Biryukov 2013 attack
Matic et al. [65] 2015 Onion proxy Passive Use location leaks in HS’s content and configuration
Kwon et al. [62] 2015 HS Entry node Passive Circuit fingerprinting attack for HS
Hayes et al. [34] 2016 ISP/Network admin Passive Propose k-fingerprinting against both normal services and HSs
Panchenko et al. [77] 2017 ISP/Network admin Passive Evaluate the scalability of fingerprinting attacks on HSs
Iacovazzi et al. [100] 2018 HS Entry and OP Active First method to embed watermarks at destination and detect at source
Iacovazzi et al. [101] 2019 HS Entry and OP Active Exploits a weakness in Tor’s congestion control mechanism
identify the guard nodes of the circuit. The methods proposed
by Biryukov et al. [31] discussed previously can be used for
that. Next, the sniper attack is used to disable these guards,
forcing the HSs to select a new set of guards. These steps can
be repeated until the adversarial guard node is selected as the
entry node for the HS. The authors argue that even though it is
possible to use the sniper attack to de-anonymise Tor clients,
it is much easier to attack HSs because they create circuits on
demand.
Iacovazzi et al. [100] introduce an inverse flow water-
marking attack called INFLOW to de-anonymise HSs. The
authors argue that in previous watermarking attacks, the attack
was only effective in tracking watermarks from source to
destination, as a watermark only travels in the direction of the
traffic flow. They claim that INFLOW is the first technique that
can insert a watermark at the destination which is detectable
at the source. It exploits Tor’s congestion management, which
stops sending messages until an ACK for the previous message
is received. When the user is downloading large amounts of
content from a server, there are increased traffic flows from the
server to the client, whereas only a few packets and ACKs are
transmitted from the client to the server. Therefore, sometimes
this amount of traffic from the client to user may not be enough
to ensure that watermarks are embedded. However, using this
concept, a modified client can drop bursts of ACKs and prompt
traffic patterns from the server which can be identified by an
attacker-controlled HS guard node.
Iacovazzi et al. [101] present a more recent active traffic
analysis attack called the Duster Attack. In this attack, the
objective is to de-anonymise HSs. A malicious client and
a set of guard relays are used for the attack. Firstly, the
attacker selects a HS and starts downloading content from
it after establishing a connection. During the data transfer,
a watermark is injected into the traffic by the Tor client. If
a malicious guard detects this watermark, it will record the
IP address of the circuit endpoint and cancel the watermark.
Tor uses a technique based on SENDME cells for congestion
control, which can be exploited to embed the signal into the
Tor traffic in this type of attack. Iacovazzi et al. experiment
on the live Tor network, and claim that this attack possesses
the following properties, lacking in previous active attacks in
the literature: 1. it works on both standard and rendezvous
circuits, 2. it is hidden from the target endpoint, 3. it has a
small overhead and does not affect network performance, 4. it
exploits vulnerabilities in Tor’s congestion control mechanism,
and 5. it works on Tor versions up to 2019. Table IV provides
a summary of all the attacks on HSs that we have discussed
in this paper while Figure 12 depicts the evolution from 2004
to 2020 of all the attacks we have discussed.
VI. SECURITY AGAINST DE-ANONYMISATION: A
DEVELOPER’S PERSPECTIVE
In this section, we try to provide insights into some of
the main security improvements and changes to Tor that
are designed to protect it against de-anonymisation attacks.
We try to present these changes from the perspective of a
developer. For this, we select several articles from the Tor Blog
(https://blog.torproject.org/) and we summarise the important
information in them. A three-part article series [104], [105],
[106] written in 2012, presents major changes in Tor since
its initial design paper in 2004 [6]. We will first discuss the
security-related changes in these articles, and then move on to
some of the later updates.
A. Security Improvements in the Directory System
In the initial Tor versions, every router in the network
generated a router descriptor which was signed and uploaded
onto one of the DSs [104]. Every DS created a signed list of
its descriptors and sent them to the clients at their request.
Among the many issues of the above mechanism, were a few
security concerns as well. 1. There was no distributed trust and
each DS was trusted individually. Hence, a compromised DS
could be used to execute an attack on all its clients. 2. The
directory content was not encrypted and easy to eavesdrop
on. 3. Disagreeing DSs could divide client knowledge, which
could allow an attacker to categorise clients based on their
recent connections to DSs. There were a few changes in
DSs along the way, including assigning flags (such as fast,
stable, good guard nodes) to nodes before the introduction of
a directory voting system. Under the directory voting system,
the DSs would share periodic vote documents and produce a
Fig. 12. Evolution of De-anonymisation Attacks
consensus document, and every DS would sign it. As a result,
the clients only needed to download one document and make
sure it was signed by a majority of known DSs. These changes
helped to address some security issues that were in the original
design.
B. Introducing Guard Nodes
In Section II, we briefly introduced guard nodes and their
purpose. Several of the early de-anonymisation attacks were
based on having an adversary-controlled entry node. Based on
the recommendations of Øverlier et al. [27], Tor implemented
the Guard Node feature to reduce the probability of circuits be-
ing compromised [105]. Ordinary Tor nodes are now assigned
guard flags based on several features such as bandwidth and
uptime. Once a Tor client selects a set of guard nodes it will
keep them for 30-60 days. This greatly reduces the chances of
an adversary compromising circuits by introducing new Tor
nodes and expecting them to be selected as entry nodes. On
the other hand, if an adversary-controlled node is selected as a
guard node, the adversary has a significant chance of achieving
their objective, as that node will repeatedly be used for many
circuits for a considerable duration.
C. Introducing Bandwidth Authorities
The nodes of a circuit were uniformly picked at random
in the earliest versions of Tor. However, this created many
bandwidth bottlenecks, hugely impacting Tor’s performance.
As a result, the Tor protocol was changed to select nodes pro-
portionally to node’s bandwidth and based on its capabilities
(e.g. entry guard, exit node). This feature increased the chances
of attackers compromising more circuits by claiming high
bandwidths for the nodes under their control. Initially, a max-
imum bandwidth limit was imposed to minimise the impact
of this, but later a set of Bandwidth Authorities were assigned
to measure and vote on the observed node bandwidth. These
measured values were published in the consensus document,
preventing the previous loophole. Also, honest node operators
were allowed to declare their nodes under the same family,
to stop the client from selecting two nodes from the same
family in the client’s circuit. This prevented node operators
from unintentionally having their nodes selected as both entry
and exit nodes of a circuit.
D. Mitigating Linkability Attacks
We mentioned a couple of attacks related to linking Tor
streams in Section V (e.g. the bad apple attack [61], [93]. Due
to the computational and bandwidth overhead to the network
when creating new circuits, Tor clients try to reuse circuits,
sending multiple TCP streams through them. The issue with
this scenario is that if one stream leaks information to de-
anonymise the user, a compromised exit node may be able to
de-anonymise other streams in that circuit as well [61]. To mit-
igate this risk, Tor limits the circuit usage time to ten minutes
before switching to a new circuit. The Tor user also has the
ability to create new circuits for new streams and configure
Tor to isolate streams based on the destination IP/port. By
default, Tor separates streams from different clients, different
SOCKS ports on a Tor client or SOCKS connections with
distinct authentication credentials.
E. A Defence Against Website Fingerprinting
We discussed several WF attacks on Tor over the years.
However, it was only following Panchenko et al.’s attack [71]
in 2011 that Tor developers became concerned with securing
the Tor network from such attacks. Panchenko et al. used
new features based on volume, timing and the direction of
traffic, which led to the successful outcome of their attack. In
an article in 2011 [74], its author mentions an experimental
defence they deployed against WF attacks. The proposed
defence - introduced as Random pipelining - was aimed at
reducing the information leakage that enabled the extraction
of features used by Panchenko et al.. Additionally, the author
of the article questions the practicality of WF attacks in the
live Tor network, a notion which was critically analysed and
supported later by the work of Juarez et al. [78].
F. Security Against the Relay Early Confirmation Attack
In July 2014, the Tor development team identified a set
of malicious relays in the live network which they believed
were trying to de-anonymise Tor users [107]. These relays
were in the network for almost five months and were able
to obtain Guard and HSDir flags. The compromised relays
were used to execute an attack known as the relay early
confirmation attack, which was an active attack that exploited
a vulnerability in Tor’s protocol headers. A new type of cells
known as relay early cells were introduced in 2008 to prevent
the creation of long paths in Tor circuits [95]. These cells were
used in the above attack, hence giving the attack its name.
In this attack, when the onion proxy tries to either publish or
retrieve a service descriptor from an attacker-controlled HSDir
node, it will insert a signal into the traffic using the above-
mentioned vulnerability in relay early cells. The attacker-
controlled guard nodes are then able to identify this signal
at the other end. After finding out about this issue, all the
malicious relays were removed from the network. Moreover,
a fix for the issue was given with the next version update
of the Tor protocol. Additionally, the above incident brought
into attention the importance of monitoring bad relays in the
Tor network. Therefore, any interested party can now report
any suspicious relays (malicious, damaged or misconfigured)
to the Tor project [108]. The development team would then
investigate the issue and take necessary actions.
G. Deploying a Padding Scheme
Following up on the traffic analysis attack suggested by
Chakravarty et al. [99] that makes use of flow records, the Tor
development team published a couple of articles explaining
that although this type of attack is theoretically possible, it
would be hard to execute it practically against the live Tor
network [109], [110]. They interpreted the 6% false-positive
rate7 as meaning that 6000 out of 100000 flows will look
similar, rendering it ineffective when scaled. Furthermore, the
authors of the articles asserted that Tor protects its users by
encryption of data within the Tor network, authentication of
7In the original paper this value is 5.5% although in the article [109], this
is used as 6%
relays and use of signatures to make sure all clients have the
same relay information. In another article from 2015 [111]
written about the circuit fingerprinting attack against HSs by
Kwon et al. [62], the author of the article brings up a similar
argument about Kwon et al.’s attack not being scaled in reality.
However, in response to the approach introduced by Kwon
et al. to identify traffic between different circuit components,
Tor has deployed a padding scheme to disguise the client-side
traffic in HS circuit creation [112].
Fig. 13. Vanguard system: 2-3-6 Topology
H. Introducing the Vanguard System
There have been real-world attacks against Tor hidden
services. In November 2014, 16 European countries along
with the United States Intelligence agencies brought down
several marketplaces hosted as HSs through a coordinated
international action called Operation Onymous [113]. Under
this operation, the LEAs took down 410 HSs and arrested 17
people who were suspected to be running the operations. The
notorious dark market known as the Silk Road 2.0 [7] was also
shut down and its operator was arrested. In response to this
massive scale attack, the Tor development team acknowledged
that they were unsure as to why this attack was carried out and
how it was carried out [114]. In an article published shortly
after the above attack [114], they discuss possible scenarios
that might have enabled this attack. HS operators’ failure to
use adequate operational security measures, the exploitation
of web bugs such as SQL injections or remote file inclusions
are some such scenarios. The authors of [114] advised the HS
operators to be better informed about HSs’ security limitations
and to make sure their services do not lack adequate memory,
processing, and network resources. The authors also suggested
to manually select known and trusted relays as the guard nodes
of the HS.
In 2018, the Tor project released the first stable version
of Tor and the Tor browser for the V3 onion service pro-
tocol [115]. According to the article [115], this protocol
version provides more secure onion addresses and improved
authentication to HSs. It further provides service enumeration
resistance and upgraded cryptography. However, the authors
of the article claim that the new upgrade does not address any
de-anonymisation attacks against HSs. Also, they state that the
highest threat faced by HSs at present are the Guard Discovery
attacks. As the second and third nodes of the HS-RP circuit
are selected from all existing Tor relays in the network, an
adversary can force circuits until it is selected as the middle
node and can then identify the guard node [31], [30]. The
guard nodes can then be compromised, attacked or surveilled
until the IP address of the HS is obtained. To address this
issue, Tor introduces a 3-component add-on to be used with
HSs [115]. As shown in Figure 13, the Vanguard component
introduces second and third layer guards. In addition, to further
increase the anonymity provided by this system, the circuit
lengths (e.g. Client - RP, HS - RP) will also be altered. The
Bandguard checks for bandwidth side-channel attacks and
closes circuits more than 24 hours old, and circuits that are
transmitting the maximum threshold of megabytes. The third
component of the add-on known as the RendGuard, analyses
RPs to check whether they have been overused. The aim of
this component is to minimise the use of malicious RPs in
potential attacks.
I. Mitigating the Risks of Website Oracles
In a follow up article [116] to the WF attack with WO
by Pulls et al. [85], the Tor development team mentions that
they are concerned about the use of low cost, high coverage
WOs such as DNS and RTB [89] to assist attackers. In [116],
the authors suggest some precautions that can be taken by
various user groups to mitigate the risks of this situation. Users
can engage in multiple activities at once with the Tor client,
exit relay operators can avoid high-risk public DNS resolvers
and stay up to date with Tor releases, and HS operators can
use V3 onion services. Additionally, in an article on Browser
Fingerprinting [117], a technique that is becoming popular
to de-anonymise users, it is explained that Tor has always
been concerned with such techniques, and the Tor browser is
currently one of the most resilient browsers against browser
fingerprinting attacks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we classified Tor attacks into four main
categories based on the objective of the attack and explained
those categories with examples. Following this, we elaborated
on de-anonymisation attacks with a taxonomy based on the
components used for attack execution. Under the classification
of de-anonymisation attacks, we provided a corpus of attacks
published in the literature, giving brief descriptions on how the
attacks are executed and how de-anonymisation is achieved.
We also provided insights into the evolution of these attacks
over the years. Finally, we discussed several security related
issues in Tor using information on articles written by the Tor
development team.
We noticed a few important features while completing this
work. 1. Most of the earlier de-anonymisation attacks focus
on compromising network components of the Tor circuit. The
main reason for this is the low number of relays in the
Tor network at the time they were published. However, with
Tor’s increasingly popularity, the number of voluntary relays
has increased and the practicality of the attacks that can be
executed by compromising a small set of Tor relays has de-
creased. Therefore, recent attacks assume passive adversaries
that can observe the traffic at the source and destination links.
2. Techniques and concepts from other research domains have
inspired Tor researchers to introduce novel attack schemes for
Tor [79] [81]. 3. Recent works are also experimenting with
techniques such as deep learning [68] [84] to attack the Tor
network.
Our work provides an up-to-date review of the most im-
portant Tor attacks. It also provides new insights into how a
critical class of these attacks, the de-anonymisation attacks,
have evolved over the years. Important issues on the deploy-
ment of these latter attacks on the live Tor network are also
provided. We hope our review and the insights it provides will
form a useful resource to the wider Tor research community.
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